Well, most unclassified pronouncements about any weapon system are pure advertising hype. What is seldom discussed are the real requirements that should bind a system. UAV/RPV’s are a perfect example–the systems seem to be getting bigger and more expensive with each model. Especially for a vehicle designed to take the place of a manned vehicle, this seems to be the very wrong direction to go. However, keep in mind that both Boeing and Northrop-Grumman have a vested interest in manned vehicles too. The real thinking may be that giving war-fighters an even choice between manned and unmanned systems all but guarantees that both systems will be maintained and employed. Nice, and it doubles revenue too . . .
I should say that an UAV/RPV–particularly one designed for recon–should be cheap and small instead of big, fast, and expensive (in fact, slow and very quiet might get some awesome pictures). Otherwise, the expense of losing one of these things may affect the calculation to use one when it is really necessary. More importantly, the bigger and more expensive these vehicles are, the less likely that anyone in a line unit is ever going to see one. UAV’s are becoming the play things for those at “echelons above Corps”–sometimes called “echelons beyond reality.”
Such “winners” as the trap-door Springfield (billed as a cheap way to convert muzzle loaders to breach loaders); the Snark (need I say more?); and MBT-80 are strewn across American acquisition history. I actually had a chance to talk to one of the persons who did the internal evaluation for the MBT-80. The 20mm cannon manned by the tank commander was required to be able to penetrate the TC hatch of a T-64B at 1000m. It could, but the convoluted scenario Chrysler/General Dynamics cooked up required the MBT-80 to be at the top of the Rift Valley in East Africa shooting directly down into the poor T-64B below–a near vertical shot.
Although the MBT-80 was never adopted, it ultimately morphed into the M-1 and the Leopard II. It would have been a ferociously expensive (and very, very heavy) main battle tank.
I think this “puffing” of weapons systems occurs because DoD abdicates any direct and control over acquisition programs and pretty much lets program managers run carte blanch. The U.S. has a long history of handling acquisition and procurement very poorly. For one brief, shining moment, things started to rationalize during the Kennedy Administration and then it went all to hell again. The prognosis for reform in the future is not good.







































